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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN R. MITCHELL, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
MERLIN C. PALMER, FLOYD 
PALMER, JOHN FRANK PAL-
MER, DAVE CLAIR PALMER 
and LOLA ALICE SCHIESS, and 
FLOYD PALMER As Trustee for 
above named defendants, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
7706 
The action was commenced by the appellant in the 
lower court against the respondents, children of the 
appellant's wife by a prior marriage, to rescind two 
warranty deeds as having been procured by fraud and 
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false representations. The appellant also sought to 
recover Two Thousand Five Hundred ($2,500.00) Dol-
lars as the proceeds of two Postal Savings Notes owned 
by the appellant's wife and the mother of respondents, 
which notes were cashed and the proceeds given to the 
respondents allegedly because of false representations 
(R. 1-4). 
The respondents in answer to the complaint denied 
any fraud or misrepresentations and alleged as an affirm-
ative defense that the property conveyed by the deeds 
rhallenged by the appellant was purchased with the 
proceeds received from the sale of the Idaho property 
owned by the respondents and if the deeds were held 
invalid, the respondents requested the court to impress 
a trust upon the property in their favor (R. 18-19). 
The court held that the appellant had no interest 
in the postal notes and granted a non-suit as to them 
at the close of the appellant's case (R. 124). After final 
submission of the case the court held that there had 
been no fraud or false misrepresentations made by the 
respondents and upheld the challenged deeds as being 
valid. Since the court found that the deeds were valid 
and subsisting, it ruled that the question of impressing 
a trust upon the property was, therefore, moot (R. 235). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts as contained in the brief of 
appellant is substantially correct; however, the respond-
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ents feel that additional faets should be called to the 
attention of the court. 
In 1937, after the death of the respondent's father, 
at a tin1e when all of the respondents were of age, Mrs. 
Mitchell, the mother of the respondents, and who in 
1943 became the wife of the appellant, conveyed certain 
Idaho property owned by her to Floyd Palmer as Trustee 
for the benefit of himself and his other brothers and 
sister, reserving a life estate in her favor (Ex. 16). 
Shortly after the marriage of the appellant and the 
mother of the respondents, one of the homes on the 
Idaho property as above mentioned was sold to a Mr. 
and ~Irs. Hendricks for the sum of Seven Thousand 
($7,000.00) Dollars (R. 130, Ex. 6). At this time all of 
the children gave quit claim deeds on the property to 
their mother to enable her to 1nake the sale (Ex. 5), 
all of which was known by the appellant (R. 131). A 
down payment of Two Thousand ( $2,000.00) Dollars was 
made by the Hendricks with which the mother of the 
respondents purchased a Postal Savings Note in the 
same amount (R. 50, 51). The balance of the contract 
was paid at the rate of Fifty ($50.00) Dollars per month 
plus interest and on December 30, 1946, a payment of 
Two Thousand Five Hundred Fifty-Three and 97 jlOO 
($2,553.97) Dollars was received in full on the contract 
(Ex. 13, R. 174). 
In September of 1946, the second home on the Idaho 
property was sold to a Mr. Thomas Paln1er for a pur-
chase price of Ten Thousand Five Hundred ($10,500.00) 
Dollars cash (R. 133). At the time of this sale quit 
elaim deeds were again obtained from the respondents 
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with the knowledge of the appellant (R. 134) and at 
that time the appellant and Mrs. Mitchell moved to Salt 
Lake City and purchased a home referred to as the 
Garfield Avenue property for the sum of Six Thousand 
Seven Hundred F·orty-Seven and 84/100 ($6,747.84) 
Dollars (R. 135). In December of the same year they 
purchased a home on Wilmington A venue referred to 
as the Wilmington property for a purchase price of 
Eight Thousand Five Hundred ($8,500.00) Dollars (Ex. 
11, R. 136). At the time of the sale of the second home 
in Idaho Mrs. :Mitchell purchased a second Postal Sav-
ings Note in the sum of Five Hundred ($500.00) Dollars 
( R. 51). The balance of the proceeds received from the 
sale of the second home in Idaho was applied on the 
purchase of the homes in Salt Lake City. 
The parties, through their attorneys, stipulated after 
an examination of the bank statements of the appellant 
and Mrs. Mitchell that com1nencing with August 31, 
1946, at which time there was a balance of $1,841.60 in 
their joint checking account in the First Security Bank 
of Idaho at Preston, Idaho, all deposits subsequent to 
said date and until the Salt Lake properties were paid 
for were made by ~1:rs. ~Etchell (R. 173-175). The more 
substantial ones were as follows: $2,553.97 on December 
30, 1946 (Ex. 13) and $9,920.20 on September 24, 1946 
(Ex. 14). Assuming equal ownership of the $1,841.60 
balance the most the appellant could have contributed 
to the purchase of the Salt Lake property was $920.80. 
At the time of n1:rs. Mitchell's death there was a balance 
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in the joint account of $2,164.68 (Ex. 15 ), which appel-
lant retained and most of which was derived from the 
sale of the Garfield property. 
According to the respondents, at the time they 
executed quit claim deeds conveying the Idaho property 
back to their nwther for the purpose of selling the same, 
it was understood among them and their mother that 
when she purchased the property in Salt Lake City, 
title to the same would be held in the san1e manner as 
title had previously been held to the Idaho property 
(R. 169). 
'Vl1en the Salt Lake property was purchased, title 
was taken in the name of the appellant and Mrs. Mitchell 
as joint tenants. During the early part of 1948 and on 
numerous other occasions, Mrs. :Mitchell told Joel Hart, 
an attorney who had prepared the papers concerning the 
Idaho property, that she wanted the Salt Lake property 
to he fixed up the same way that the Idaho property had 
been (R. 158-162). On Decoration Day of 1948, Mrs. 
Mitchell was too ill to go to Preston, Idaho and as a 
result thereof Mr. Floyd Palmer came to Salt Lake City 
on the 31st day of May, 1948, to see how his mother was 
getting along. During this visit Mrs. Mitchell told Floyd 
Palmer in the presenca of the appellant and Merlin 
Palmer that she would like to have the property fixed 
up the same way the Idaho property had been (R. 178, 
202). As requested deeds were prepared conveying the 
Salt Lake homes to Floyd Palmer as Trustee, reserving 
a life estate in the appellant in the Wilmington Avenue 
home (Ex. D, E). The~e are the deeds which the appel-
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lant seeks to set aside as having been obtained by fraud 
and misrepresentation. 
The deeds were signed by the mother of the respond-
ents at her home in the presence of the appellant and 
Merlin Palmer (R. 183). The appellant admits that he 
signed some documents at that time, but that he did 
not know they were deeds. Instead he claims he thought 
they were papers rnaking Floyd Palmer Trustee of the 
postal notes. The respondents maintained that after 
l\frs. Mitchell signed the deeds, the appellant and Merlin 
Palmer went to the Hart l\fusic Company in Sugar House 
and the appellant there signed the deeds in the presence 
of Joel Hart and Merlin Palmer (R. 184). After the 
execution and acknowledgment had been made, the deeds 
were handed to Merlin Palmer in the presence of the 
appellant (R. 185), and from that time on Merlin Palmer 
retained complete control and dominion over the same, 
even though they were deposited in a safety deposit 
box held in the names of himself and Mr. and Mrs. 
}[itchell (R. 192-193). 
STA':rEl\1ENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THERE IS SUFFICIENT COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUSTAIN THE TRIAL COURT'S HOLDING THAT THE 
DEEDS WERE VALID IN ALL RESPECTS (REPLY TO 
APPELLANT'S POINTS 1, 2 AND 4). 
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POINT JI. 
THE COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT EVEN ASSUM-
ING THE DEEDS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO BE RE-
CORDED THAT FACT WOULD NOT AFFECT THEIR 
VALIDITY BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE DEEDS 
(REPLY TO APPELLANT'S POINT 3) 
POINT I. 
THERE IS SUFFICIENT COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUSTAIN THE TRIAL COURT'S HOLDING THAT THE 
DEEDS WERE VALID IN ALL RESPECTS (REPLY TO 
APPELLANT'S POINTS 1, 2 AND 4) 
At the close of the trial, the court took the matter 
tmder advisement and subsequently dictated a decision. 
This decision was relied upon by counsel for the respond-
ents as being sufficient to constitute Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and a judgment was prepared 
based thereon. Part of the court's decision is as fol-
lows: 
"The first question presented is as to the 
validity of the two warrantv deeds set forth in 
plaintiff's complaint, and ~hich plaintiff seeks 
to have declared null and void on the grounds 
that said plaintiff's signature to said deeds was 
obtained by fraud and misrepresentation on the 
part of the defendants. The court sees no escape 
from the conclusion, and has no doubt, about the 
fact that the plaintiff, when he signed the two 
deeds involved in the action, being Exhibits D 
and E, sig-ned the deeds knm:ving-ly and willingly, 
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and there were no misrepresentations as to the 
nature or contents of the instrument made by 
the defendants, or any of them; and the deeds, 
when signed, were complete except for the signa-
tures of the grantors and the jurat of the notary; 
the court finds that the plaintiff knew and in-
tended, when said instruments were executed, to 
convey to the grantee named therein any and all 
interest he had in the property described in the 
deeds, re:::;erving only to himself a life estate in 
what is referred to as the Wilmington property, 
being Exhibit D; that said deeds are valid and 
subsisting deeds, and the plaintiff has a life estate 
in the Wilmington property described in Exhibit 
D." (R. 234). 
It appears from the above statement that the deci-
sion rendered by the trial court was without any reser-
vations or hesitancy as to what the facts established. 
Since the errors urged by the appellant in Points 1, 
2 and 4 are prirnarily concerned with the sufficiency of 
the evidence and the court having found in favor of the 
respondents the rule on appeal is fundamental that if 
there is any competent evidence to support the decision 
of the trial court said decision will be affirmed. 
Only a portion of the evidence which supports the 
judgment of the trial court is reviewed herein. Joe~ 
Hart testified as follows upon cross-examination con-
cerning a conversation had with 1\irs. Mitchell at the 
time he prepared the deeds quit claiming the Idaho 
property back to Mrs. Mitchell: 
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""Q. \Vho gave you the instructions and the direc-
tion to fill in those portions of each of these 
deeds which you have testified to having filled 
in' 
A. .Mrs .. Mitehell, originally. 
Q. At the ti1ne the deed8 were made·~ 
A. At the ti1ne the property was * * * the deeds 
in Idaho were n1ade. * * * 
Q. \V ell, that * * * 
A. * * * conveying away the property. 
Q. That was the deeds in Idaho, is that correct~ 
. .:\.. But she mentioned that she wanted this prop-
erty she was going to buy in Salt Lake fixed 
up the same way as the property was in 
Idaho. 
Q. \V ell, that was in Idaho she said that, wasn't 
it~ 
A. It was in Idaho in view of property, or con-
telnplated buying in Ptal1." (R. 169) 
After the appellant and Mrs. Mitchell had purchased 
the property in Salt Lake the same witness testified con-
cerning a further conversation with Mrs. Mitchell and 
in the presence of the appellant, which occurred at the 
Sugar House Music Company in approximately :t:ebruary 
or April of 1947 (R. 158-162). His testimony is as fol-
lows: 
"Mrs. Mitchell mentioned to me that she 
would like to have her property fixed. up in the 
same manner which the Idaho property had been 
fixed, so that the children would be named as"""""" 
or so that Floyd would be named * "" * Floyd 
Palmer "" * "" would be named as Trustee for the 
rfl~t of thfl {'hilrlrfln." (R. 162) 
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Mr. Hart testified that he had other such conversa-
tions with Mrs. Mitchell (R. 162). 
Merlin Palmer, one of the respondents, testified 
concerning a conversation had with his mother on May 
31, 1948, in the presence of the appellant and his brother 
Floyd Palmer. Part of the conversation is as follows: 
"Mother said that she would like the property 
put in the trusteeship in the same fashion it had 
been in Preston, Idaho-on the Preston, Idaho 
property-with Floyd as Trustee and all the rest 
of the children in it under him." (R. 178) 
In this same conversation the witness further testified 
that the appellant stated as follows: 
"He said that all he wanted was a place to 
stay for the rest of his life, and mother said the 
same thing." (R. 179) 
Mr. Palmer further testified that at the request of 
his mother the appellant secured an envelope (Ex. 12) 
containing the deeds to both pieces of property from 
which legal descriptions were secured for the prepara-
tion of the deeds which the appellant seeks to have 
rescinded ( R. 180-181). 
Concerning the conversation on May 31 at the Wilm-
ington home in the presence of the appellant, Floyd 
Palmer ·testified that his mother stated as follows: 
" 'Floyd, while you are down here, I would 
like to have this property fixed the same as the 
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Idaho property was,' she says, ·I have just 
neglected doing it.' She said, 'I have been up to 
illr. Richard's office once, going to have him do 
it, but he wasn't in.' She said, 'Mr. :Mitchell and 
I went up, but he wasn't there,' and otherwise 
she just neglected having it done. She said, 'I 
would like to have this fixed up just as soon as 
possible.'" (R. 202) 
Floyd Palmer further testified concerning this con-
versation: 
"~lother stated, she says, 'I want this prop-
erty fixed the same as it was in Idaho, or in 
Preston, but,' she says, 'in Preston, he had no 
life estate,' but she says, 'here, I would like to 
make Rome provision where he would have a place 
to live.' At that instant, Mr. l\1:itchell looked up; 
he was sitting in n1y father's over-stuffed leather 
chair; he looked up, he says, 'Yes, all I want is a 
place to live.' " (R. 202) 
After the deeds had been prepared Merlin Palmer 
testified that Joel Hart placed one small cross on the 
deeds indicating the place where Mrs. Mitchell was to 
sign the deeds (R. 182, Ex. DE). Mr. Palmer then took 
the deeds to his mother's home where she signed them 
as indicated, after which Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Palmer 
returned to the Sugar House Music Company and Mr. 
Mitchell signed the deeds in the presence of Merlin 
Palmer and Joel Hart (R. 183, 184). After Mr. Mitchell 
signed the deeds and they were notarized by Mr. Hart, 
the deeds were given to Mr. Palmer in the presence of 
.Mr. Mitchell (R. 185). 
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Concerning the credibility of the appellant's testi-
mony and in corroboration of respondents' evidence the 
appellant himself admits signing an agreement (Ex. 1) 
soon after the death of Mrs. Mitchell which recites that 
furniture, household fixtures, appliances, etc., "will be 
held intact until dissolution of the life estate." Although 
the appellant claims he did not read the first part of the 
agreement he did check the listing of the items thereon 
and admits that he told the respondents that the furni-
ture should stay with the house because he needed them 
(R. 60). At the same time, the appellant signed an agree-
ment with the respondents (Ex. 2) by which it was agreed 
that the respondents would make no claims upon the 
bank account; however, the appellant was to pay all of 
the hospital and doctor bills pertaining to Mrs. Mitchell's 
last illness and the expense of burial, etc. 
The appellant further admits that he did not receive 
any payments except one after Mrs. Mitchell's death from 
the purchasers of the Garfield Avenue property (R. 27). 
On l\farch 25, 1949, a letter was written to the appellant 
by Floyd Palmer, one of the respondents (Ex. 3), in 
which Mr. Pahner makes a demand for the $60.00 pay-
ment received by the appellant after Mrs. :Mitchell's 
death and further states in the letter as follows: 
"As to the life estate you have in the Wil-
mington property, you are to keep all expenses 
up on this property, also fire insurance." 
In this same letter it is suggested that the respond-
ents would build the appellant a home to live in at 
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Preston, Idaho, having in 1nind selling the \Yilmington 
Avenue property. Although the appellant admits receiv-
ing this letter and discussing with Floyd Palmer the 
suggestion that he move to Idaho and also admits writ-
ing a card dated ~lay 2, 1949 (Ex. 5), in which he tells 
.Mr. Floyd Pahner that he has decided to stay in Salt 
Lake, the appellant testified that he did not know any-
thing about the deeds and the life estate reserved to hirn 
until the early part of 1950 when a real estate agent 
t!~'t;l~ investigated the records at the · "/ liecorder's office 
(R. 43). In view of this and other evidence, it is obvious 
that the court was justified, if not con1pelled, to hold 
that the appellant intended to 1nake the conveyance 
shown by the deeds, which lack of intent is urged as 
error in the first point of the appellant's brief. 
The ~econd point questions the issue of delivery of 
the deeds. It is not disputed that the appellant did in 
fact deliver the documents which he signed; however, 
the appellant's position would appear to be that although 
there was a delivery in fact, such a delivery was not 
valid in law since it was obtained by fraud. But since 
the court found "there was no misrepresentation as to 
the nature or content of the instrument" and that the 
appellant signed the deeds "knowingly and willingly" 
and intended to convey any and all interest he had in 
the property except the life estate, it is obvious that the 
delivery in fact was a good delivery at law. 
The appellant also challenged the delivery of the 
deeds on the ground that the grantors retained some 
control over the sarne. According to the respondents, 
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after the signing of the deeds at the Hart Music Com-
pany in Sugar House, Joel Hart then handed them to 
Merlin Palmer in the presence of the appellant (R. 171, 
185). Merlin Palmer then deposited the deeds in a safety 
deposit borx to which he and the appellant and Mrs. 
Mitchell all had access (R. 192-3). This Honorable Court 
has held that if there is a valid delivery initially, the 
fact that the deed is left in a place equally accessible 
to the grantors and grantees will not render the delivery 
invalid. Wilson v. Wilson, 32 Utah 169, 176, 89 P. 643; 
Chamberlain v. Larsen, 83 Utah 420, 438, 29 P. 2nd 355. 
The appellant also offered evidence to the effect 
that the deeds were not recorded because there was a 
possibility that the Wilmington property would be sold 
and the proceeds used to purchase a duplex for Mrs. 
Mitchell which would give her a place to live and income 
during her life. It is not disputed that such was the 
reason for not recording the deeds; however, the re-
spondents submit that such fact does not support the 
contention that there was not a valid delivery. Respond-
ents were dealing with their mother and if she would 
have been happier in a duplex, they naturally were will-
ing to transfer their interest in the two homes into a 
duplex subject to a life estate. 
At the time of the sale of the Idaho property it was 
an inconvenience to prepare and secure quit claim deeds 
from all of the children. At the time of the conveyance 
of the Salt Lake property to the respondents there was 
a "For Sale" sign on the Wilmington property and the 
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possibility of a sale was anticipated ... If the deeds were 
recorded, it would again be inconvenient to secure deeds 
from all of the children if the transfer of interests were 
made upon the purchase of a duplex. No doubt the 
respondents and their mother contemplated that if a 
sale were made, the deeds would be cancelled and new 
deeds prepared arranging title in the smne manner on 
the duplex. However, this possibility was in no way 
~sserted as a condition upon the delivery of the deeds. 
The request not to record the deeds does not without 
more constitute a conditional delivery of the san1e. 
In Trilson v. W,ilson, 32 Utah 169, 89 P. 643, the 
father as grantor had deeds prepared conveying numer-
ous tracts of land to his sons and had the deeds given 
to one of the grantees who placed them in a safety de-
posit box to which the grantor also had access. The 
grantor re1nained in possession of the residence, which 
was conveyed by one of the deeds, and otherwise par-
ticipated and lived off from the business also conveyed 
to the sons. 
In Woolley v. Taylor, 45 Utah 227, 144 P. 1094, a 
father had a deed prepared conveying his home to his 
daughter, which deed was given to the grantee after 
execution and acknowledgment but was not recorded 
until after the grantor's death. During the remainder 
of the grantor's life he resided in the home, paid the 
insurance and taxes, and made improvements thereon. 
In Chamberlain v. Larsen, 83 Utah 420, 29 P. 2d 355, 
the grantor had a deed prepared conveying the property 
to her sister. The conveyancer thought he gave the 
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deed back to the grantor after acknowledging her signa-
ture. The deed was kept in a safety deposit box in the 
name of the grantor; however, both the grantor and 
grantee went to the box together on numerous occasions. 
There was testimony that after the date of the deed the 
grantor stated she wanted to sell the property. Also 
the grantor paid the insurance and taxes until her death. 
After the grantor's death the grantee stated that she 
did not know whether the place was hers or whether it 
went to someone else. 
In all three cases the Supreme Court held there was 
a valid delivery. In the Chamberlain case the trial court 
held there was not a valid delivery, which ruling was 
reversed on appeal. In these cases the court has stated 
two rules which should be applied to this case. 
First: That a deed duly executed and acknowledged 
and shown to be in the possession of the grantee is self-
proving both as to the execution and delivery and the 
presumption raised by such facts can only be rebutted by 
clear and convincing evidence. 
Second: That a delivery may be made which is 
sufficient to convey a present interest to be enjoyed in 
the future. Such being the case continued acceptance 
of the benefits and assumption of the burdens of the 
property by the grantor is not inconsistent, especially 
when a family relation exists, with a valid delivery of the 
deeds. 
After reviewing the file in this action having in mind 
the law developed in the three cases mentioned above, 
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the conclusion that the trial court correctly decided the 
case cannot be denied. 
Point 4 of the appellant's brief claims there was 
error in not considering the question of intent and 
delivery of the deeds which is obviously the same issue 
raised by Points 1 and 2 as herein discussed. In line 
with the recent Utah Supre1ne Court case of Morley v. 
W,illde11, et al., :2~15 P. 2d 500, it appears sufficient to 
state that, "A careful examination thereof (the record) 
leads us to conclude that the trial court's findings and 
decision are supported by a fair preponderance of the 
evidence and should remain undisturbed, * * * " 
POINT II. 
THE COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT EVEN ASSUM-
ING THE DEEDS CHALLENGED HEREIN WERE NOT 
ENTITLED TO BE RECORDED THAT FACT WOULD NOT 
AFFECT THEIR VALIDITY BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO 
THE DEEDS (REPLY TO APPELLANT'S POINT 3). 
1. The court in its decision stated as follows: 
"Questions have been raised about the deeds 
not being certified or acknowledged in the ways 
provided by the statutes of Utah. So far as this 
case is concerned, that matter is of no conse-
quence, as an acknowledgment is not necessary 
to the validity of a deed as between the parties, 
and is a requirement merely with respect to 
recordation." (R. 235) 
There can he no question but what the court'~ deci-
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sion, as quoted above correctly states the law in Utah. 
Title 78, Chapter 1, Section 6, 1943, Utah Code Anno-
tated as amended provides in part as follows : 
"Every conveyance of real estate, and every 
instrument of writing setting forth an agreement 
to convey any real estate or whereby any real 
estate may be affected, to operate as notice to 
third persons shall be proved or acknowledged 
and certified in the manner prescribed by this 
title and recorded in the office of the Recorder 
of the County in whiCh such real estate is situ-
ated, but shall be valid and binding between the 
parties thereto without such proofs, acknowledg-
ment, certification or record, and as to other per-
sons who have had actual notice." 
This provision of the present law is substantially 
identical with a similar section of the earlier laws of 
Utah as construed in Murray -v. Beal, 23 Utah 548, 65 
P. 726, which held that an instrument need not be validly 
acknowledged in order to be effective between the parties. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence not only fails to show by clear and 
convincing proof that there was no delivery of the deeds 
or that the appellant did not intend to convey the proper-
ty, but rather the court was compelled to find that the 
appellant knowingly and willingly made the conveyances 
and that there was a valid delivery of the deeds. The 
decision as dicta ted by the court shows the court had 
no doubt concerning the facts established by the evi-
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dence. Considering the statutory and case law of Utah, 
it is manifest that the decision of the court based upon 
such facts was legally compelled. The decision required 
by the record and the law is likewise a fair and equitable 
determination of the case and therefore should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS & BIRD AND 
DAN S. BUSHNELL, 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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